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PACOM Visit
20 – 22 July 2010

Joint Staff OCS Update

Summary of JS, J4 CJCS OCS Task Force Current and Future Activities

CDR Mark Runstrom, SC, USN
JS J-4, Chief, Operational

Agenda

- Chairman's Report: Dependency on Contractors
  - BLUF
  - Rationale
  - Why Plan for OCS?
  - Chairman's Guidance
  - OCS Way Ahead
  - Authorities
- Contracting in COIN
- JCASO
- Non-Acquisition OCS Education and Training
- OCS in JCIDS
- Congressional Engagements
- Component Annex W

The Bottom Line

- DOD is dependent on contract support for large scale, longer term overseas contingency and stability operations across all phases (particularly phase III-V) in key logistics, net-centric, protection, and building partnership capability areas

- Especially when the following are involved:
  - Executive force cap
  - Troop rotation timing
  - Dwell time policy
  - High demand / low density skills sets
  - And quality of life for military personnel are preserved

Planning for OCS: Rationale

- **Our level of dependency on contractor support in contingency operations demands improved planning for OCS to:**
  - **Allow for smarter allocation of resources**
  - **Support risk assessments**
  - **Ensure adequate life support**
  - **Drive program recommendations and budget proposals**

Service components must improve fidelity in OCS planning

Chairman's Guidance

1. Direct inclusion of OCS planning equities in strategic guidance (GEF, JSCP, GFMIG, and JOPES) to influence cultural shift and drive planning behavior

2. Direct a COCOM (with a warning order) to include contractor estimates and support requirements in a plan coming up for review

3. Develop and institutionalize processes and related tools that facilitate and strengthen OCS planning and execution

4. Define the joint force requirement for OCS planning & execution capabilities and bridge with supporting IT business systems

5. Direct military department force developers to review TF II observations to inform risk analysis, tradeoffs and force structure decisions

6. Determine what percentage of contracted capabilities can be displaced by Reserve forces and at what cost

OCS – Building Capability and Capacity (POA&M)

Task Priority Sequence	Time	Spt Req'd: Services &	FY 10 4Q	FY 11 1Q	FY 11 2Q	FY 11 3Q	FY 11 4Q	FY 12 1Q	FY 12 2Q	FY 12 3Q	FY 12 4Q	FY 13 1Q	FY 13 2Q	FY 13 3Q	FY 13 4Q
				18 Mo.						18 -> 36 Mo.					
Automation **> OCS Planning Automation Requirements:** Determine and validate Planning IT change recommendations to JOPES and OCS systems of record (Contractor UTCs) **> Contractor Estimator Tool:** Determine planning factors. Refine, adjust, and optimize tool.; ID resource sponsor (include in APEX tool suite per APEX schedule) **> Functional requirements for Planning:** Assess JCRM, GCSS, SPOT, etc. for OCS planning component(s) and integration. Deliver JCIDS compliant product(s)	16 – 36 mo.	J3; IT Rqm't Bds; IT PMs; BTA	Oct Oct Oct Oct					Dec 11			Sep 12	Nov 12	Mar 13		Sep 13
Concepts & Doctrine **> Uniform Joint Task List:** Assess and build comprehensive OCS UJTLs. Update UJTLs manual. **> Doctrine:** Leverage TF III, exercises, and recent operations to refine and mature JP 4-10 OCS doctrine. Provide inputs **> Concepts:** Develop OCS 8- to 20-year operational concept required to extend OCS capabilities to satisfy future capability needs. **> Lessons Learned:** Define roles and functions of OCS and assign responsibilities to institutionalize lessons learned	12 – 24 mo.	J7; COCOMs; JFCOM	Present Present Present	Dec				Jan 12 Dec 11		Jun 12					Sep 13
Policy & Planning **> Change Recommendations:** Complete OCS planning changes to guidance, policy, and instructions for joint uses **> Planning Processes & Templates:** Complete processes and templates that enable OCS planning ➢**Planning Processes & Templates:** Direct contractor estimate in OPLAN for JS review	11 – 36 mo.	OSD(P); J3; J7; J5	Present	Nov				Dec 11			Sep 11				
Training & Education **> Training and Education:** Develop a Non-acquisition Joint OCS Training, Education and Exercise Vision & Strategy	14 mo.	ADUSD(PS); NDU; JFCOM		Dec				Dec 11							
Process **> Processes:** Develop processes & systems design to optimize OCS for the		BTA; DRAR;													

Legend
Start Month
End Month / Year

AUTHORITIES

Strategic Guidance Timeline & OCS Change Recommendations

WHEN

WHAT

HOW

Jul 2010 – Not on street

Global Employment of the Force (GEF) - OSD

- Identify contractor support to organic forces in level 3 and 4 plan force development lists when planning deployment and redeployment for Phases 0 thru V
- Address contractor accountability, visibility, deployment processing requirements, protection, life support, arming, individual responsibility, and personal conduct standards

GEF + 60 Days

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - CJCS

- OCS related planning assumptions stated early in CCDR initial planning documents

-Minimally, Plans will ID contracting requirements, by JCA, by phase of operations, and area of nee

-OCS related content now required for all levels of detail planning (i.e., 22 elements of Annex W) 'required' for level 3T, and 4 Plans. Selected elements required or addressed in body of level 1, 2, and 3 plans

JSCP + 180 Days

Logistics Supplement to the JSCP -- CJCS

-In process assessment; change requirements provided to J4 Jun 24, 2010.

-Refine requirements for Annex W development , to include Appendix 1 construct; OCS as a Logistics Supportability Analysis (LSA) capability/ subject; addition of OCS and logistics related terms to Acronyms and Glossary; and addition of reference : Joint Pub 4-10, Operational Contract Support

Summer 2010

Planning Joint Logistics Support CJCS

Contents - TBD

Contracting in COIN

The Role of Contractors in Afghanistan



Example (US ONLY)

- Contractors play a vital role in supporting ISAF. **Over 95% of logistic support** and **developmental projects** are **contracted**.
- **Contracted Functions:**
  - Fuel
  - Food
  - Transportation
  - Base Support Services
  - Construction
  - Maintenance
  - Aviation
  - Training
  - Development
- Because of their overwhelming presence the actions and behaviour of contractors play a key role in shaping Afghan attitudes and impressions of ISAF.
- GIRoA is concerned about **harmful practises, corruption, and lack of oversight** of sub-contractors; further frustrated by perceived **impunity under the MTA**.
- Unfortunately, ISAF has little visibility of the **contractors network**, the **flow of money**, the linkage to **maligned actors**

Contracting is a tremendous Force Multiplier & helps stimulate the local economy … but not always linked to COIN

tions of contractors shape Afghan attitudes and overall impression of I

The Contracting Network and the Lack of Transparency



- **Billions of dollars** flow into Afghanistan to fund projects / services executed by contractors.
- Contracting authorities are numerous (USG, IC, NGO's).
- We have a difficult time **tracing the money flow** past the prime contractor.
- **Powerbrokers / money lords are heavily involved** in contracting … and the rich get richer.
- The **Afghan people feel left out** and conclude that the international community is exacerbating corruption.

AFGHAN PEOPLES' PERCEPTIONS

Add'l forms of corruption:
1. overpaying for goods/services
2. Sub-standard materials / work
3. Contracts enrich the warlords/powerbrokers

$10 million leaves through airports daily

Is our money delivering the desired effects?

Contracting Lines of Effort

4

IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY
- GIRoA
- AFGHAN PEOPLE
- CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES

MITIGATION of HARMFUL EFFECTS
- AVOID OVERPAYMENTS, OVERSPECS
- MONEY LORDS
- CHANGE IN CONTRACTING CULTURE

ANTI-CORRUPTION
- TRANSPARENCY of MONEY FLOW
- IDENTIFY MALIGN ACTORS AND MONEY LORDS

AFGHAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
- EMPLOY AFGHANS
- DEVELOP JOB SKILLS
- BUY LOCALLY
- ENCOURAGE COOPERATIVE SOCIAL REINVESTMENT

LINKING CONTRACTORS TO A WINNING COIN STRATEGY

WINNING THE AFGHAN PEOPLE !

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN

Key Take-aways

1. The combination of **money and haste** (urgency) **favours the malign actor** … and more money is coming (2011).
2. We can do everything in **full compliance** with national acquisition regulations, **spend billions on development** … and **still lose** if we ignore the **perception of the Afghan population**.
3. **Obstacles** to success are plenty: **rule of law**, **conflict of interest**, lack of a shared visibility of the **money flow** … but there are things we **can** do.
4. Linking "contracting to COIN" requires the **efforts of everyone** (accountability at every level): **spenders**, **contracting authorities**, **oversight agencies**, **battle space owners**, intel, law enforcement agencies … vendors.
5. This is not an indictment of the **contracting community**, who

Contracting is not the root cause of corruption,
but corruption clearly feeds off contract money

…will COIN!

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)

JCASO: Duties and Responsibilities

Chairman's Instruction

- Codify JCASO roles and responsibilities
  - Deployed: CCDR and JTF staff support
  - Authorities & functions delegated or in support of the Joint Staff
    - Lessons Learned
    - Joint OCS Education and Training
    - Exercises
    - Center of Excellence

Non-Acquisition Operational Contract Support Education and Training (NOCSET)

NOCSET

- History
- JKDDC
- CJSL
- Problem
- Solution
- Near Term Objectives
  - Policy
  - Vision & Strategy
  - Learning Objectives
- Resourcing

Operational Contract Support In JCIDS

OCS in JCIDS

- CONOPS
- CBA
- ICD
- Joint Concept (was JIC)

Congressional Engagements

- **Congressional Inquiries**
- **Senior Leader Testimony Support**
- **Commission on Wartime Contracting**
- **GAO**
- **CRS**
- **Misc Staff engagements**

OCS Planning Component Annex W

Improving Joint OCS Planning & Integration 4



- *Upstream* – Improve Rules, Processes & Tools
  - Institutionalize OCS planning to a similar level of fidelity as we do organic forces
- *Downstream* – Need your help communicating!
  - OCS Planning is not a logistics only issue!
  - Expand community to include J1s-J8s, Service Components and Agencies

Recommendations

4

- Partner with us to improve OCS planning at component level
  - Processes & templates
  - Life support and movement requirements

Soon ... Linking contracted support to a winning COIN strategy in Afghanistan

- Sustain ongoing training & education
  - Commanders -- w/large contractor footprint
  - CORs -- Enable proper oversight
  - Staff -- Requirements generation
  - All -- Contractor oversight in all levels of formal education
  - Mitigate risk of fraud, waste and abuse

- Sustain high quality and appropriate quantity of contracting and contractor management workforce

Our level of dependency on contracted support is likely to continue for the foreseeable future … so we must plan for it

Component Annex W

Placeholder: Annex W Comparison Chart

QUESTIONS?

Backup

Historical Perspective
Dependence on Contractors





* Shorter duration of conflict during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield required less contractor support. Numbers do not include HNS from Saudi Arabia.

** Force caps in Kosovo/Bosnia resulted in higher contractor-to-military ratios.

Iraq Study Approach

- An iterative process using a multi-disciplined, cross-cutting approach that spanned CENTCOM, Services, Defense Agencies, OSD and Joint Staff



Examined:

- 8 QTRS of CENTCOM Contractor Census
- 36,000 lines of contract data
- Binned Contracts by Type
- Categorized by JCA
- Mapped to UJTLs
- In-depth look at 3Q FY08
- Compared Contractors to BOG
- Identified ICAs with high

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Contractor Dependency

Iraq – 3rd Quarter FY08



Joint Capability Area	CONTRACTOR	MIL	Ratio
Force Support	1,150	3,577	.32 : 1
Battlespace Awareness	389	4,065	.10 : 1
Force Application	197	63,110	.003 : 1
Logistics	150,794	31,142	4.8 : 1
Command & Control	6	3882	.001 : 1
Net-Centric	1,743	1,796	.98 : 1
Protection	8,824	28,131	.31 : 1
Building Partnerships	14,064	10,057	1.4 : 1
Corporate Mgmt & Spt	1,904	765	2.5 : 1
	179,071	146,525	1.2: 1

Logistics Tier II JCA

Iraq – 3rd Quarter FY08



Tier II JCA	% of Dependency	CONTRACTOR	MIL	Ratio
Deploy/Distribution	39 %	5,638	8,990	.63 : 1
Supply	17 %	184	924	.20 : 1
Maintain	80 %	7,816	1,906	4.1 : 1
Engineering	36 %	3,866	6,770	.57 : 1
Logistics Services	99 %	63,892	817	78 : 1
Installation Support	86 %	69,387	11,735	5.9 : 1

As a whole, DOD is most dependent on contracted support for logistics operations (150,794 personnel)

Logistics Tier II

Log Services + Installation Support

4

Logistics & Installations Tier III

- Food Service
- Water and Ice Services
- Base camp Services
- Hygiene Services
- Real Property Life Cycle Management
- Installation Services



External & Theater Support Contracts

Food Service Contract Examples

- Dining Facilities
- Refrigerated Units/Trucks
- Catering Services
- Full Food Services

Base Camp Services Contract Examples

- Detainee Ops
- Waste Management/ Sanitation
- O&M Services
- Base Support
- Laborers

Real Property Life Cycle Mgmt Examples

- Construction
- Equipment Rental
- Labor
- O&M Services

Installation Services Contract Examples

- Guard Services
- Internal Security
- Janitorial Services
- Vehicle/Transportatin Support
- Temp Labor
- Generic Logistical Support

CJCS TF
Change Recommendations: Rules




Align Strategic Guidance
Global Employment of the Force (GEF)
Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
Joint Operational Planning & Execution System (JOPES)
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
Policy
CJ CSM 3122.01A JOPES Manual Vol. 1 "Policies, Plans & Procedures"
Templates
CJ CSM 3122.03 JOPES Manual Vol. 2 "Plans and Formats"
Execution
CJ CSM 3122.02C JOPES Manual Vol. 3 TPFDD "Planning and Execution"
Detailed Templates for Loggies
On the way... CJ CSM 4300.01A Planning Joint Logistics Support Publication
Evaluate the Plan
CJ CSI 3110.03C Logistics Supplement to the JSCP
Planning Considerations to building Annexes and Appendices & Sustainability & Feasibility Assessment
OPLANS & CONPLANS Base Plan: (Para 4) Admin & Logistics (Contracting Guidance)
Annex W CSIP
Annex E CMP
Other Annexes

- Direct use of revised Annex W
- Improved Strategic Guidance required to influence cultural shift to take OCS planning to the next level

CJCS TF
Change Recommendations: Processes



Operationalize Contracts by Capability Area



Unit Type Codes (UTC) for significant Contract Services



Universal Joint Task Lists (UJTL)



Military Department Provided Phase (O) Contractor Force Lists

e.g. Theater Business Clearance (TBC)

- Planning for organic forces is institutionalized, yet planning for contracted support is viewed as “too hard” and an execution issue

- Need component level templates & repeatable processes to facilitate detailed plan development

CJCS TF
Change Recommendations: Tools



- We need OCS planning processes and IT systems that allow for seamless transition between planning and execution
- OCS planning processes and IT systems must feed executable force projection display systems

OCS POA&M

- Bottom line – fully institutionalizing OCS will require more than an 18-month effort
  - 15 actions are needed to institutionalizing OCS
    - Eleven actions require special identification; four involve ongoing management or planning oversight
    - Each action was assessed to develop a start date, FTE level of effort, and time duration for each action
    - Assessment spread over a maximum of 36 months to either complete or transform to a standard process
  - Over 23 FTEs needed to meet estimated rqmts

How Much Money?

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

Break out FY09

Millions of Dollars



Contracting Agency Workload FY09



- **USACE** and **CSTC-A** are top spenders
- **Significant pressure to spend more money** the next three years (FY10 **52%** increase)
- Requires deliberate **"effects based approach"** to mitigate harmful processes and corruption

Money is our most significant non-kinetic weapon

Sources:(ASFF I-Book), US AID Afghanistan,US TOTAL FPDS FY09 Actions,USFOR-A J8,FPDS

Money and Likely COIN Effects

- Not all contracts have equal impact on the COIN strategy.

- 2 broad contract categories:
  - Sustainment to the Force.
  - Development / capacity building.



TOP 14 VENDORS

Represents **30%** of total money

SUPREME	$1,147,172,476.59
KBR	$609,769,754.75
FLUOR	$415,998,686.23
DYNCORP	$278,181,935.45
BEARINGPOINT, INC.	$240,964,070.70
ECC INTERNATIONAL LLC	$209,392,452.00
LOUIS BERGER GROUP INC	$184,550,288.29
DYNCORP LLC	$178,733,272.60
LOCKHEED MARTIN	$172,254,583.51
LAKESHORE ENGINEERING SERVICES	$167,420,623.00
CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INT INC	$159,582,852.00
NATIONAL FUEL INC	$158,395,463.73
INGLETT & STUBBS, LLC	$133,847,942.85
AECOM GOVERNMENT SERVICES INC	$132,719,577.98
Grand Total	**$4,188,983,979.68**

MISC FOREIGN CONTRACTORS	$2,434,470,781.00



Focus on portion of money with greatest effect in Afghanistan

Reduced Effectiveness of Money

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CONTRACTS



We tend to want everything fast.





Corruption grows stronger with ic money.

- We face the characteristics of an organised crime network.
- Organised crime flourishes when central government and civil society are disorganised, weak, absent or mistrusted.
- Lack of jurisprudence and political will allows corrupt networks to operate with impunity.

"It is just as difficult to detect an official's dishonesty as it is to discover how much water is drunk by the swimming fish"

Chanakya (c. 340-293 BC)